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Abstract 
 
The Council for the Organisation of Relief Services Overseas (CORSO), established 
in 1944, was dedicated to the relief of poverty overseas. It was a New Zealand 
organisation which acted to co-ordinate the activities of different national bodies; all 
of whom shared a vision of working towards such relief of the poverty. CORSO’s 
primary vision for such relief being organised “under one umbrella” attracted 50 
member organisations by 1967. Legitimacy theory provides an undemanding 
theoretical frame for early CORSO. It also explains the period of crisis in relation to 
reduced legitimacy when, in the 1960s, CORSO began to focus increasingly on 
development to build foundations for impoverished peoples overseas to gain greater 
self-reliance. This change in strategic direction was insufficiently communicated to 
the general public, though it was generally accepted within the organisation. 
 
From the 1970s the increased politicisation of society impacted on CORSO’s 
membership, and Maori radicals became prominent in CORSO along with ‘leftist’ 
individuals and groups. The early strong coalition was progressively replaced with 
divisiveness from the mid-1970s amid growing public mistrust of CORSO; as it 
changed from an apolitical body to one increasingly focused on issues from an anti-
capitalist stance. Polarisation and the subsequent consequences are similar to other 
not-for-profit coalitions. 
 
Deterioration in budgeting was concomitant with CORSO’s declining Appeal 
proceeds. Without suggesting a central role for accounting in CORSO’s decline, the 
correlation of robust or deficient accounting processes respectively with economic 
good and poor health appears positive. Until the late 1960s, evidence indicates a 
robust accounting process which subsequently deteriorated, from the 1975 Treasurer’s 
Report onwards. In examining CORSO’s decline from 1970, until its ‘functional 
death’ in 1991, the causes of this decline provide a valuable illustration of the 
importance of political independence and integrity for charitable organisations’ 
survival.  
 
The data for this study is derived from primary and secondary sources including 
newspaper articles, annual reports, correspondence and opinion surveys. This research 
also analyses accounting data, evidencing a correlation of robust or deficient 
accounting processes respectively with economic excellent or poor health. To this 
extent the accounting data provides a ‘bio-marker’ of organisational health.  
 
Key to CORSO’s demise was a change in strategic direction brokered by governing 
members which resulted in a philosophical shift unsupported by many of its core 
orthodox member bodies, with ‘fatal’ consequences. CORSO from 1990 was not a 
broad-based coalition, but survives as a persistent, yet impaired, brand name 
employed by a small coalition of socialists and Maori radicals. CORSO failed to erect 
barriers to capture, or to recognise it. This historic perspective on the demise of such a 
giant in New Zealand charities provides a clear illustration of a failure to sense and 
adapt sufficiently to its dynamic political landscape, and illustrates how the not-for-
profit sector is more dependant than other sectors on continuing legitimisation 
processes in its implicit contract with the society to which it offers its vision. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Refugees, displaced by war and famines, are an external manifestation of the 
successes and failures which cyclically affect nation states and their citizens. Photos 
of displaced peoples exhibit a pathos which opens hearts and wallets to charities 
established to aid distress. Like the people they aim to assist, charities also experience 
cyclical success and failure. In order to survive and thrive, they must constantly adapt 
to new conditions.  
This is a report of one charity which enjoyed wide-spread support, but, in its reaction 
to adaptive opportunities, provides warnings that other charities would do well to 
heed. It is the objective of this report to examine CORSO
1
, a New Zealand 
organisation that coordinated overseas aid. CORSO began in 1944 and rapidly grew 
to become New Zealand’s premier aid agency, occupying this position until 1977. By 
examining CORSO’s decline from 1970, until its ‘functional death’
2
 in 1991, the 
causes of this decline provide a valuable illustration of the importance of political 
independence and integrity for the survival of charitable organisations.  
As is essential for all not-for-profit organisations, CORSO’s legitimacy with its 
donors and supporters was vital. This paper considers the manner in which CORSO 
both shaped that legitimacy and shunned it, as marginalised activists captured 
management. There are two critical decisions that caused organisational ‘stress’; the 
first impacting the organisation from the late 1960s and the second from the late 
1970s. From a purposive perspective the impact of these decisions may allow us to 
argue for the standard of accounting control and recording as ‘bio-markers’ of 
organisational health. In a favourable environment (until 1970), accounting controls 
and records demonstrate rigour. These deteriorate from 1974 and functionally 
collapse between 1986 and 1989; thus precipitating the failure of the organisation 
which had, effectively, lost legitimacy. 
Data for this research included both secondary and archival sources. Secondary 
sources of both a general and (CORSO) specific nature were located. This was useful 
in creating a broad view of the organisation and identifying further potential sources. 
Secondary sources included books, newspapers and magazines. Following this 
                                                
1 Council for the Organisation of Relief Services Overseas 
2 This reference is to its demise as a substantial NZ aid agency. 
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process, and parallel to it, numerous primary source documents (at the Alexander 
Turnbull Library) in the form of annual reports, correspondence between member 
group representatives and the organisation, CORSO publications and press releases 
were also accessed. Primary sources provide unique challenges as they are often 
presented illogically, reflect bias or, in the case of annual reports, contain 
inconsistencies between years or are discontinuous. Conversely, secondary sources, in 
particular the CORSO ‘biography’ by Thompson (1969), the North and South article 
(1991) and several newspaper articles, were replete with concise, although selective, 
information. The limitation of such secondary sources includes the topicality of their 
focus. This dictates the chosen ‘lens’ through which CORSO was viewed and it 
creates temporal parameters around information presentation. Direction to sources, 
both primary and secondary, was aided by a limited collaboration with PhD candidate, 
Peter Kitchenman, who is presently investigating CORSO.  
Legitimacy theory provides an undemanding theoretical frame for early CORSO. It 
also explains the period of crisis in relation to reduced legitimacy when, in the 1960s, 
CORSO began to focus increasingly on development to build foundations for 
impoverished peoples overseas to gain greater self-reliance. This change in strategic 
direction was insufficiently communicated to the general public, though it was 
generally accepted within the organisation. CORSO failed to erect barriers to capture, 
or to recognise it. This historic perspective on the demise of such a giant in New 
Zealand charities provides a clear illustration of a failure to sense and adapt 
sufficiently to its dynamic political landscape, and illustrates how the not-for-profit 
sector is more dependant than other sectors on continuing legitimisation processes in 
its implicit contract with the society to which it offers its vision. 
2.0 The CORSO Story 
2.1 Introduction 
CORSO was established on August 16 1944, as an overseas aid coordination body by 
the National Council of Churches, The Society of Friends and Red Cross (NZ) 
(Thompson, 1969). Its early years were marked by great success and it was often 
engaged by other agencies to distribute their material aid, acting as an umbrella 
organisation for groups interested in overseas aid (Lovell-Smith, 1986). This coalition 
structure served it well in the stable society of post-World War II New Zealand. From 
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1970 the preconditions that led to CORSO’s decline emerged. The importance of 
organisations in society as microcosmic components of the whole has been noted and 
infers reflexively the impact of societal developments on these organisations. 
Historically, with regard to charities in New Zealand, women’s support through their 
importance in volunteer labour, was vital for success. As it pertains to CORSO, an 
organisation reliant on volunteer collectors, this observation is of particular 
significance with the increased participation of women in paid employment from the 
1960s (Tennant, 2001) as it reduced women’s discretionary time for philanthropic 
activity. Volunteer labour was essential due to the labour intensity of material aid 
handling and ‘door-to-door’ appeals. In addition, suggestions of a decline in the 
“sense of community”, with economic policies stressing individualism, could be 
expected to have a disproportional impact on CORSO relative to other charities 
(Wilson, Hendricks & Smithies, 2001) if it did not evolve along with societal change.  
From around 1970, society became increasingly politicised and CORSO’s structure 
was such that it could not step outside of this societal influence. Dissent grew within 
the organisation over its goals and methods. External factors arose threatening the 
primacy of the organisation in terms of overseas aid and development. Increased 
competition from international agencies occurred throughout the 1970s and, from 
1975, good relations with the government deteriorated. These issues, aggravated by 
limited public awareness of overseas aid issues, caused CORSO to decline in relative 
importance into the 1980s. CORSO’s modus operandi was at variance with its new 
international rivals. These organisations used television advertising coupled with 
street appeals which required less labour than door to door collections. Also, they 
sought only cash donations and not material items, and thus had a reduced 
dependency on volunteer labour. This study shows how CORSO’s structure was such 
that it lacked effective mechanisms to exclude (or control) minority groups with more 
radical “agendas” than their core middle-class membership. 
Increasingly, from 1977, CORSO presented a radical leadership that alienated public 
support. By 1990 the priority given in their activities to Maori development caused 
the near collapse of CORSO. Media attention alluding to the possible future demise of 
CORSO caused an otherwise uninformed public to rapidly eschew the organisation. 
The annual door-to-door appeal was abandoned. Subsequent to this period the 
organisation reflected a continuation of radicalism. Its remnant contemporary form 
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berates GATT, the WTO and promotes Maori sovereignty. For the purposes of this 
discussion, focus is directed to the period up to 1991 and the functional ‘death’ of 
CORSO as a national orthodox foreign aid organisation. 
2.2. CORSO and the changing environment in which it existed (1944-
1981): The growth (1944-1969) 
CORSO began towards the end of World War Two in response to the plight of war 
dislocated refugees, specifically four million displaced Europeans. The organisation’s 
primary aid focus was to Greece, Yugoslavia and Poland (Thompson, 1967). From 
1947 it extended its activities to China, aiding people adversely affected by the war 
with Japan (Thompson, 1969). It coordinated the overseas relief activities of its 
member groups3, acting as a conduit for resources, material (including shoes, clothes 
and medicines) and cash, to overseas organisations dedicated to foreign aid (Lovell-
Smith, 1986; Thompson, 1969). Principal amongst these bodies were those of the 
United Nations, the UNRRA (UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency) and later, 
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). CORSO enjoyed success in its early 
period, with an integral role in New Zealand’s social framework, receiving strong 
support from a cross-section of society, including many church groups (Thompson, 
1967). In addition, from 1951 onwards, CORSO ran public, charitable appeals.  
During this period relations between CORSO and successive governments were 
consistently positive, and Government lifted its wartime restrictions on charitable 
appeals to allow CORSO to resource its activities. Golden Kiwi grants were later 
allocated by the government to CORSO
4
. Consistently favourable relations were 
maintained with subsequent governments (including Prime Minister Walter Nash5, 
who willed CORSO a legacy) until 1975. But from this time the organisation’s 
growing radicalism brought it into conflict with the National government of Robert 
Muldoon as will be further described. 
In essence, the first twenty-five years of CORSO evidenced broadly steady growth, 
attributed to an inclusive structure favourable to a wide cross-section of groups6. This 
                                                
3 See Appendix 1 for a listing of these. 
4 Golden Kiwi was a national lottery. Funding from this source caused objections amongst some church 
groups belonging to CORSO because of their anti-gambling beliefs. This concern was addressed by 
establishing a separate fund for these receipts (Thompson, 1967). 
5 Elected leader of the Labour party in 1951 and Prime Minister from 1957-1960. 
6 By 1967 the CORSO ‘coalition’ comprised fifty organisations as shown in Appendix 1. 
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was also reflected by increasing fund inflows over that period, from an income of 
$172,000 in 1952 to $2.3 million in goods and $700,000 in cash in 1965 (Thompson, 
1969)7. Growth was supported by a benign, stable social environment and limited 
competition from other charitable organisations, as few major international aid 
charities had then arrived in New Zealand.  
From 1965 the growth of CORSO engendered two major organisational challenges. 
Expansion and increasing organisational complexity had necessitated decentralisation 
and the establishment of six sub-committees of the Executive 8 . Almost 
contemporaneously (from 1969), major changes in CORSO’s field staff occurred 
(Thompson, 1969). These internal factors, combined with a steady growth in 
charitable appeals presented more administrative cost over-runs and a challenging 
operating environment9. Furthermore, workforce and lifestyle shifts were recognised 
in Thompson’s ‘biography’ of CORSO as a challenge, but the organisation felt 
confident in its ability to react to these changes (Thompson, 1969).  
2.3. 1970-1981: The Decline 
It was the changing social environment facing CORSO from 1970 that was to start the 
organisation’s decline. Political activism offshore spread to New Zealand, affecting 
CORSO’s membership base as well as the focus of CORSO’s aid. The combination of 
these factors militated to cement the decline of CORSO through the 1970s which, 
despite a brief renaissance in to the mid-1980s, was functionally terminal. 
Significant societal changes included the growing politicisation in representative 
groups as a domestic reflection of the counter-cultural developments overseas. For 
example, anti-Vietnam War protests evidenced this radicalisation so that insular, 
conformist society groups became increasingly exposed to movements motivated by 
societal critique. The ‘flower power’ generation challenged existing social norms 
from the early 1970s, aided by increasing awareness of the wider world through the 
growth of television (North and South, 1991). This created internal friction between 
new member groups and the traditional support base of CORSO. The inclusion of new 
                                                
7 Refer to Figure 2, page 14, and related commentary for details regarding material donations. 
8 These were Finance and Property, Budget and Projects, Staffing and Administration, Publicity and 
Education, Material Aid, and Youth Against Hunger (Thompson, 1969). 
9 In 1969 CORSO targeted 10% administration costs but an increasing recognition of the need to 
advertise in the face of growing competition would lead to higher costs. 
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groups represented increased political awareness (Dominion, 1974a; 1974b)
10
 and by 
1972 there was a clear emergence of a changing agenda within CORSO. Further, the 
‘global village’ effect brought increasing competition from international 
organisations
11
. These organisations brought overseas credentials to their local 
operations, posing a threat to any indigenous charities.  
Political awareness also diverted the particular focus of CORSO. Firstly, a new 
understanding emerged that reactive aid initiatives, the mainstay of CORSO’s work, 
did little in the long-term to ameliorate poverty (Arnold and Glensor, 1974). This 
realisation directed CORSO’s attention progressively towards local issues in 
infrastructure development, in particular overseas jurisdictions. Secondly, progressive 
radicalisation was reflected in growing concerns for poverty in New Zealand. 
2.4 Aid Focus 
In response to the realisation that the past endeavours had failed to address the causes 
of poverty, increased focus on development arose within CORSO. CORSO 
publications in 1972 and 1974 detailed the failure generally of aid agencies initiatives 
from 1945 to 1972, citing the relief focus as the cause of failure (Arnold and Glensor, 
1974). Over this period the relative economic position of developing countries had 
deteriorated in contrast to the post-World War II boon in North America and 
Australasia. From 1950 to 1970 these developing countries showed a decline in their 
contribution to global exports from 32% to 18%, on deteriorating terms of trade12. In 
addition, their Gross National Product (GNP) grew by just 25% from 1960-69 to a 
nominal average of US$218 per capita and developing country debt grew from 
US$37.5 billion to US$59.3 billion in the period 1965-1969. This deteriorating 
situation prompted CORSO to focus increasingly on the causes of underdevelopment 
and poverty (Balasuriya, 1974). The previous practice of providing material aid from 
clothes drives was also seen as ineffective and, from the late 1960s, expensive in 
terms of the new focus.  
                                                
10 The 1967 addition to membership of the New Zealand University Students Association was one such 
group. 
11 Consideration is not given to the competition created by the emergence of environmentally focused 
charities. These may have aggravated ‘donation fatigue’ but they are not significant in terms of 
CORSO’s decline relative to other aid agencies. 
12 This specific measure may be somewhat misleading in that wartime demand for commodities is 
likely to have inflated demand and prices for developing country exports. 
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A resulting focus was placed on the causes of poverty and on development in 
preference to relief. This policy transition also occurred in Christian World Service 
(CWS), a CORSO member (Lovell-Smith, 1986). Yet indications exist that the public 
held a perception of aid as synonymous with crisis relief, conflicting with the 
transition in CORSO policy towards development. This shift amongst the 
organisation’s leadership meant that in 1972 the CORSO council called for analysis of 
New Zealand’s relationship with developing countries with a view to identifying 
imbalances between New Zealand and those countries (Arnold and Glensor, 1974). In 
1978 confidential notes from the CORSO discretionary fund reveal $5,000 was sent to 
dissident groups subject to repression in Malaysia for publication of their newspaper, 
Mimbar (De Bres, Campbell & Harris, 1974). The organisation’s relationship with 
CWS grew closer under Pamela Gruber’s leadership of that organisation (Lovell-
Smith, 1986). This organisation was itself becoming more political, directing funds 
from its annual Christmas appeals to causes, including fighting racism in South Africa 
(Lovell-Smith, 1986).  
2.5 New Zealand Focus 
Both CORSO and CWS engaged in an increasing critique of New Zealand societal 
values, identifying a lack of ‘distributive economic justice’. Highlighting injustices to 
Maori came to form a significant part of the policy agenda of these two organisations. 
From 1972 a growing focus on poverty in New Zealand was central to CORSO’s 
relief programme. This caused conflict with the Muldoon-led government from 1979 
(North and South, 1991). 
2.6 Divisions within CORSO: the reaction to change 
Unquestionably, tensions emerged within CORSO between increasingly disparate 
groups. The more traditional membership base remained largely apolitical, seeking to 
extend aid and poverty relief to overseas destinations. In contrast, newer membership 
groups sought far-reaching political changes, both internationally and domestically13. 
Disquiet over CORSO’s changing direction is articulated from 1973 with concerns 
                                                
13 This division is clearly in evidence at a Special Meeting held 1 December 1973 in which CORSO’s 
Information and Education Resource Committee proposed to establish a division called Action for 
World Development. Concerns by CORSO chairman, N. Guscott and treasurer A. Irvine related to the 
control this Committee would have over the new division and they proposed it be established outside of 
CORSO. Their failure to move this body away from CORSO led to their resignation ( Dominion 1974a; 
1974b). 
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expressed at the fourth Annual Regional Conference in Gore (held on 27th April 1974) 
that CORSO should stay with safe issues and avoid criticism. Attendees were 
disquieted regarding the variety of the 60 groups then comprising the organisation 
(CORSO, Gore, 1974). 
Battles for CORSO’s control and its reducing integrity began destabilisation in the 
early 1970s. Further, a decision was made at the 1975 AGM to alter CORSO’s 
structure yet again. A new class for individual membership (as well as groups), 
increased regional cooperation, the introduction of a new class of consultation, and a 
new constitution were all intended to create a closer-knit structure. The leadership 
believed that factions evident would be resolved further by the establishment of three 
clear aims: relief, development, and education in New Zealand on the causes of 
underdevelopment (CORSO Annual Report, 1975). 
However, the lack of central control of CORSO was perpetuated and probably 
aggravated by these changes as the Director was replaced by a new office of General 
Secretary and co-ordination rather than direction, was accentuated (CORSO Annual 
Report, 1976). Although internal support remained strong, a clear decline in resource 
inflows appears post-1973, showing the changes and re-stated aims had done little to 
stem the decline. Documentary evidence of public perception confirmed a rising 
mistrust and, combined with the societal changes already referred to, reduced 
donations to CORSO, reflecting the loss of legitimacy. A later section of this study 
considers three incidents from the 1970s which highlight this decline, and the impact 
on income of these events.  
2.7 Accounting as a bio-marker 
The annual accounts reveal difficulties in financing operations from 1970 (CORSO, 
1976). Previously conservative budgets for the succeeding year were published with 
annual reports. The conservatism of these is reflected in 1967 and 1968 publications 
where modest expectations were set in recognition of the recession New Zealand then 
faced (CORSO Annual Report, 1967; 1968). Expenditure was budgeted to correspond 
with modest income forecasts and adherence to budgeted expenditure was rigorous.  
Yet the 1970s experience was of income below budgets and declining. The 1974 
Annual Report included treasurer concerns over the level of income (down on budget) 
and meanwhile, expenses were ahead of forecast (CORSO Annual Report, 1974).  
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Table 1. Annual Income against Budget and actual donations  
 1967 1968 1969 1971 1975 1977 
Budget income  500,000 650,000  750,000 540,000 
Actual income 670,000 622,000 695,684 1,124,000 589,507 508,000 
General donations 520,000 506,000 503,327   201,000 
Sources: CORSO Annual Report, 1968; CORSO Annual Report, 1971; CORSO Annual Report, 1974; CORSO 
Annual Report, 1975; CORSO Annual Report, 1976; CORSO Annual Report, 197814. 
Table 1 shows these income projections and reports. Rising administrative expenses 
are important in light of public concerns surrounding how much of appeal funds 
collected actually went to those it was intended to benefit (Survey one, n.d.; 
International Research Limited, 1973). It is difficult to imagine accounting was 
central to CORSO’s decline but it can be seen to reflect (as a bio-marker) the impact 
of the organisation’s changing ‘fortunes’, both financial and non-financial. 
2.8 The reflection of the fall in legitimacy from Public Attitude Surveys 
The New Zealand public’s general perception of overseas aid was that it should be 
geared to meeting peoples’ immediate needs, relieving famine and hardship. This 
perception, whilst reflective of a lack of education concerning the value of 
development, caused public confusion over CORSO’s programme (Otago Daily 
Times, 2000). These factors are identified in two surveys conducted in 1973. In a 
survey of twenty-six people, fifteen indicated they would not be prepared to donate to 
CORSO (Survey one, n.d.) with eighteen nominating CORSO as their least preferred 
charity. The report analyses reasons by gender. Men expressed concern in relation to 
the magnitude of administration costs and the amount of funds reaching the intended 
destination. In contrast, many women were sceptical that those active in the charity 
sought self-enrichment, some citing they had donated clothing for overseas aid, only 
to see it being worn locally by CORSO collectors. However, both groups were 
                                                
14 Incomplete data is due to changing annual report presentation. The data tabled is, however, sufficient 
to expose the comparative deterioration in accounting controls and budgeting when the organisation is 
under organisational stress. A period of crisis and dissent occurred from 1973 and is accompanied by 
less robust accounting. The table also reveals a high percentage of general donations relative to total 
income in 1967 and 1968. This tends to suggest greater sustainability/recurrence of this income than 
that income sourced from special appeals. It may be argued that it is a proxy vote of confidence in the 
organisation per se. Growing reliance on this source of funding is also important due to the style of new 
aid rivals and their focus on ‘special, emotive’ appeals. 
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concerned about donated funds not reaching intended beneficiaries and articulated a 
preference for domestically focused charities (Survey one, nd).  
The respondents voiced a primary concern for aid to respond to hunger, a point 
reiterated in a second survey (502 respondents) in which 66% identified hunger as the 
priority (Research International Limited, 1973). In this later survey, only 15% of 
respondents thought CORSO should control distribution whereas 39% favoured the 
Red Cross and 21% preferred government control
15
. Similarly, 12% felt CORSO was 
the least suitable agency (Research International Limited, 1973). CORSO’s changed 
focus to development, its dependence on postal appeals and, it seems, falling out of 
touch with “heartland” New Zealand, had undermined its previous position as a 
charity of choice. 
2.9 CORSO’s ‘collision’ with the National Government 
In addition, the increasing political activism of CORSO through the 1970s led to 
deterioration in government relations. Until 1975, relations with the then Labour 
Government had been positive. CORSO had expressed concerns when National came 
to office in 1975 as CORSO’s growing focus on poverty in New Zealand placed it in 
direct opposition to the new Government. New member groups were increasingly 
radical by this time, largely due to General Secretary Toby Truell who assumed the 
office in 1977 (CORSO Annual Report, 1978). A measure of organisational tension is 
reflected in his comment that CORSO had been stacked with church people when he 
assumed office, but that much had been done to lessen its reliance on these groups 
through his tenure (Lovell-Smith, 1986). One part of this reduced reliance on ‘church 
people’ was the admission of the Maori Council to CORSO membership in 1977. 
Furthermore, CORSO changed its name in 1977 to the New Zealand Justice and 
Development Organisation but retained CORSO for the purposes of stakeholder 
recognition.  
The catalyst for the government collision was CORSO’s film produced in 1979, titled 
A Fair Deal (CORSO Annual Report, 1979). Television New Zealand refused to 
screen this film which focused on labour exploitation in Hong Kong and aimed to 
                                                
15 Although surveys indicated a majority (71%) approved of foreign aid most had a limited 
understanding of the issues (Otago Daily Times, 2000; Applied Research Consultants, 1987). 
Relatively high profile private sector appeals led to a belief that charitable organisations were 
responsible for most overseas aid. In reality, the majority of overseas aid originates from government 
(Applied Research Consultants, 1987). 
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educate the public of New Zealand’s role in causing such poverty. The film, in 
combination with CORSO’s attention to poverty amongst Maori and other 
disadvantaged groups in New Zealand society, caused a government backlash16. On 
19 September 1979 the government legislated the removal of the tax exempt status of 
CORSO and ended a $40,000 annual government grant to the organisation (Evening 
Post, 1994).  
Member organisations of CORSO were broadly supportive, with the majority opposed 
to the punitive government action. There were letters to government to reverse its 
action, press releases (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1968), and numerous donations 
were made in support of CORSO by such bodies as the Pencarrow Labour Electorate 
Committee (1979). Sentiments of support for CORSO came from disparate quarters, 
including Trade Aid, The Values Party, Volunteer Service Abroad, and many church 
representatives (Chairman of Trade Aid to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; The 
Values Party in Press Release; VSA in News Release)17. 
In contrast (although not concurring with the government action) six members or 
affiliates expressed concern about CORSO’s direction. The YMCA, in a letter dated 
21 September 1979, requested CORSO General Secretary Truell to remain low key 
and focus on overseas aid (Government Action vs. CORSO, 1978-9). The New 
Zealand Federation of University Women (Inc.) noted reservations about the quality 
of the educational materials CORSO was distributing (Government Action vs. 
CORSO, 1978-9). Similarly, the National Council of Women of New Zealand (1979) 
expressed concern that their donation of $100 had been spent on producing a Trades 
Council leaflet and indicated they would review their membership of CORSO in 1980. 
A letter from the Convener of the Methodist Internal Affairs Committee (1979) 
suggested the need to investigate what CORSO did with its money. 
Although the financial results in relation to appeal income suggest the sympathetic 
reaction to the government ‘collision’ outweighed negative reaction; in terms of the 
public generally indications exist of a level of mistrust engendered by adverse 
                                                
16 Prime Minister Robert Muldoon was outraged at CORSO’s position that poverty existed in New 
Zealand and that New Zealand, through trade, was responsible for contributing to poverty overseas. He 
lamented the demise of CORSO’s focus on aid and the emergence of its political agenda. Consistent 
with his forthright political style he appears to have taken the attack somewhat personally and reacted 
vigorously. His animosity towards CORSO was in no key regard lessened by their attack on the 1981 
Springbok tour of New Zealand (New Internationalist, 1982). 
17 Information illustrating the impact of Muldoon’s attack on CORSO is presented in Figure 2 on page 
16 and related commentaries. 
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publicity in relation to CORSO (Otago Daily Times, 2000). Over the longer term, it 
appears the public were not prepared to support the radical political agenda presented 
by the uniquely New Zealand aid agencies, CORSO and CWS (NZ) (Evening Post, 
1994) and this incisively reflected the loss of legitimacy, as already described. 
2.10 The rise of competition in the foreign aid market 
The 1970s evidenced the arrival of various international aid-agency charities to New 
Zealand. Previously any rivalry between charitable organisations had been restrained 
or low-key. The establishment of the New Zealand office of World Vision in 1971 
heralded increasing competition in the sector (North and South, 1991). Furthermore, 
World Vision remained removed from the politicisation that impacted indigenous 
organisations, and was more closely corresponding with public perceptions of an 
international charity.  
Figure 1. Incomes for Aid Agencies in New Zealand in 1972 and 1984.
18
 
 
                                                
18 It is interesting to note that, of funds raised by other organisations, between 67% and 91% was 
applied to overseas aid. For CORSO that amount was just 50%. Of the 50% that remained in NZ, 62% 
(31% of funds raised) was used for administration and the balance went on education. This education 
budget exceeds all of its competitors. Also worthy of mention are the relative improvement in the 
fortunes of CWS and The Leprosy Mission. In particular, CWS was both essentially indigenous and 
progressing towards radicalism. An examination of its dynamics and comparative vigour may well be 
useful in viewing CORSO’s fate. 
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World Vision’s overseas experience in donor-generation methods applied to the local 
situation, and resulted in that organisation’s rise from its beginnings in 1971 to 
becoming the largest aid agency in New Zealand by 1977 (Lovell-Smith, 1986). In 
similar fashion, the TEAR FUND (The Evangelical Alliance Relief Fund) grew 
rapidly from its inception in New Zealand in 1974 (Lovell-Smith, 1986). These 
agencies simply collected funds through advertising-supported appeals, for 
distribution as overseas aid. The magnitude of the shift in the relative incomes of 
domestic and international aid agencies is depicted in Figure 1. 
2.11.  CORSO: 1981-1991: Financial and funding difficulties 
The start of the 1980s saw a brief ‘renaissance’ of CORSO and its fortunes (CORSO 
Annual Reports 1982; 1983; 1985). As any other plausible explanation is absent, the 
sympathetic reaction to “Muldoonist” bullying appears the likely driver (CORSO 
Annual Report, 1980). This development peaked in 1985 on the back of a generalised 
increase in public awareness of Aid projects occasioned by ‘Live Aid’.19 Whilst 1979 
had seen a decrease in donations to CORSO over the preceding year, an increase 
occurred in 1980, from $461,000 to $528,000 (CORSO Annual Report, 1980). This 
trend continued through to 1984 and was amplified by ‘Live Aid’ in 1985 (CORSO 
Annual Report, 1975). Thereafter CORSO’s fortunes progressively declined until 
1990 when key personnel left to establish a New Zealand branch of Oxfam 
(Dominion, 1991). From this point, relative to the growth in other agencies and in 
absolute terms, CORSO was essentially defunct as an organisation. The 
contextualisation of CORSO fortunes requires a view of the organisation relative to 
other aid agencies as shown in Figure 1
20
. 
Figure 2 shows CORSO’s income and administrative expenses as well as receipts 
from annual appeals up to this period. The precipitous growth in cash inflows in 1985 
is indicative of a more general increase in the profile of overseas suffering; it does not 
                                                
19 Live Aid was an aid raising initiative of Bob Geldoff, former lead singer of ‘The Boomtown Rats’. It 
involved a diverse range of ‘Pop Stars’ in the UK and America, generating a chart-topping single track 
on each side of the Atlantic. Its purpose was to publicise the plight of those afflicted by famine and 
drought in Africa and to raise funds to alleviate this suffering. 
20 This is necessary as a species of control for the effect of inflation on the real value of fund inflows. 
Inflation over this period was up to 17% per annum. For this reason nominal dollar inflows are not a 
decisive determinant of the comparative decline of CORSO, only CORSO’s resource base relative to 
its competitors can reveal this (Baskerville, 1999). 
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reflect a fundamental revitalisation of CORSO. This is supported by its subsequent 
decline in the latter half of the 1980s. The peaks (1971-1975) reflect the impact of 
special appeals in the main with the treasurer reporting concern in 1974 regarding 
over-reliance on these appeals
21
. 
What is illustrative of organisational ill-health is the convergence of CORSO’s 
expenses (administrative and fund raising), represented by the black line, and annual 
appeal income, CORSO’s principal recurrent source of unencumbered funds. Inflation 
adjustment essentially flattens the slight increase in expenses and in relation to 
income adjusted for inflation, a decline in real terms from 1971 is in evidence.  
Figure 2: CORSO Income and Expenditure (1967-1991)  
 
Source: CORSO Annual Reports: 1967-1982; 1985-1986; North and South, 1991; Overview, 1991; 1987; CORSO 
AGM, 1990 
In 1974 there was an end to discussion on collections of clothing. This had been 
foreshadowed since the late 1960s when the cost of handling and transporting clothing 
arises as a concern (1968-1969). In the 1968 Annual Report concerns are reflected 
about the cost of transporting clothing. The cost recorded is $50,674 but the report 
indicates actual costs, including depreciation, could be as much as double this amount. 
Handling clothes consumed half of staff time. It was also noted that “no one dies from 
a lack of clothes”.  
                                                
21 These included ‘Operation Hope’ and ‘Live Aid’ in 1985, focusing on famine in Saharan Africa. 
Similarly, the Indo-China appeal in 1975 met with a favourable response. The 1973 Ethiopia and West 
Africa appeal returned $457,405 as opposed to general donations of $471,463 (see figure 2 for further 
details). In 1971 the special appeal focused on east Pakistan (now Bangladesh). 
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Growing donation specification from 1985 contributed to inflexibility of fund 
application with increasing levels of specification of legacies (Evening Post, 1994), 
again reflecting the loss of legitimacy. Prima facie this suggests a reluctant scepticism 
on the part of the donors who favoured overseas aid undertakings (CORSO Annual 
Report, 1986). This led to financial crisis in 1989. Towards the end of the coverage 
period there is a paucity of information, due to the cessation of annual reports. 
However, the 1986 Annual Report alludes to the financial difficulties related to 
increasing specification of donations and legacies.  
2.12 Radical activism 
The progressive radicalisation that had begun in the 1970s, accelerating in the latter 
part of that decade, continued through the 1980s. The leftist agenda was reflected in 
the call for a ‘new economic order’ (CORSO Annual Report, 1978). Once ‘captured’ 
by the left the leadership ensconced this agenda with a further restructure in 1979 
which centralised control of projects through a National Projects Officer (CORSO 
Annual Report, 1979). Expenditure on community awareness and education more 
than doubled from 1983 to 1985, to $156,466 (CORSO Annual Report, 1983; 1985). 
Increasingly, CORSO was perceived as a radical, communist organisation, and appeal 
responses indicated dissatisfaction with the organisation predicated on anti-
communism (CORSO Newsletter, 1978).  
From 1984 CORSO’s General Secretary, Ross Stevens, implemented a ‘Justice begins 
at Home’ programme and developed the Maori Development Fund known as the 
Aotearoa Puutea Fund (from 1986) (CORSO Newsletter, 1994). The developing New 
Zealand focus for CORSO’s activities was encapsulated in the aims of this fund 
which was to utilise two-thirds of CORSO’s income within New Zealand (CORSO 
Annual Report, 1986). The localisation of aid resulted in a negative public reaction as 
already noted.  
In 1986 the Aotearoa Puutea Fund gained a full-time coordinator, H. Halkyard 
Harawira (CORSO Annual Report, 1986) and in the same year a newsletter presented 
the then radical view that the Treaty of Waitangi was a fraud (CORSO Newsletter, 
1986). Now the dissent between Maori and non-Maori members of CORSO, plus 
increased specification of donations, placed financial pressure on the organisation as 
leaders had less ability to direct fund flows. In 1984 $63,617 of donations were 
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specified relative to $880,000 total income, but specification increased to $453,234 in 
1985 against of $1.7 million total income (CORSO Annual report, 1986). This 
suggests an increase in some scepticism towards CORSO’s integrity as a conduit of 
unspecified aid funds.  
2.13 The ‘implosion’ of CORSO 
Organisationally, CORSO had not encountered the need to preclude or control 
individual agenda until the early 1970s. This organisational ‘delicacy’ resulted in 
capture in the late 1970s. After this time centrality of control challenged many 
member groups’ commitment to the organisation. The 1988 AGM saw further 
divisions in relation to effective fund raising, and a physical assault on CORSO 
member Pomau Papali’i by one of the “Maori radical Harawira faction” (Mary 
Woodward to Elizabeth Duke, 3 October 1990)22. The Auckland branch proposed 
winding CORSO up and resigned themselves to expulsion. 
Organisational tensions were revealed in letters (e.g. Duke to Woodward) and in 
records of CORSO’s 1990 AGM which identified reasons behind the monetary crisis. 
Long-term budgeting problems, inadequate provision for administration costs, 
competition from the advent of Lotto, and general economic stress in New Zealand 
from restructuring were exacerbated by a lack of annual accounts since 1986 (CORSO 
AGM, 1990). Deterioration in accounting controls aggravated by increased level of 
donation specification and a marked decline in income post-1985 led to financial 
difficulties by 1989. The 1990 annual report presents a balance sheet in which 
negative net assets are stated at $194,596, corresponding approximately with the over-
budgeting for that year’s annual appeal as $109,000 had been collected against an 
anticipated $300,000. Mounting debt resulted in all but two staff being sacked, which 
still resulted in administration costing 51% of income (CORSO AGM, 1990).  
Many key personal, disenchanted with CORSO’s direction and fractiousness, deserted 
the organisation in 1990 to establish Oxfam (NZ) (Dominion, 1991). This 
organisation offered a secular alternative to the Christian-based World Vision. Many 
CORSO supporters switched their allegiance to this new organisation. The Governor 
                                                
22 Mary Woodward was a member of CORSO Auckland (Mt. Eden). This branch was dissatisfied with 
the organisation and had proposed winding it up. Reference to ‘Friends’ not getting involved as a 
Society suggests her involvement in CORSO was by way of The Society of Friends. It is believed 
Elizabeth Duke was a Dunedin member of CORSO, also a member by way of her involvement with 
The Society of Friends. 
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General, Catherine Tizard, and Edmund Hillary became patrons of Oxfam (Evening 
Post, 1994).  
To combat negative press from dissatisfied members, CORSO sought to compare its 
efficiency in distributing aid with that of Oxfam. It promoted itself as by-passing the 
international bureaucracies due to its exclusive New Zealand nature. Furthermore, in 
Issue 42 of Overview (the CORSO magazine) expenses were $13,231 (16.2%) for its 
1990 Annual Appeal, against $81,569 income. This was compared with Oxfam’s 
target to hold expenses to 30% of income. CORSO criticised the budgeted advertising 
expenses of other aid organisations as “expensive”. Yet comparative income evidence 
suggests such advertising was necessary and effective in attracting funds. 
2.14 The Competitive environment 
In this period the international agencies prospered (Evening Post, 1994). Their 
campaigns and advertising were ‘slicker’ and their emotive promotions better 
accorded with public perceptions. World Vision’s ‘Forty Hour Famine’ was, and 
remains, an effective way of enlisting support. Child sponsorship, in which a photo 
and letter from the child sponsored are sent regularly proved popular. The focus was 
both sentimental and responsive to urgent need, a strategy that has proven successful 
in mobilising public support (North and South, 1991). Further, the organisations using 
these promotional devices remained apolitical. The shift in public support to these 
bodies was reflected in their growth of fund inflows. In contrast, CORSO presented as 
an increasingly confused and factious organisation. Its political nature alienated 
public support. 
Externally the aid ‘market’ had become progressively more crowded from the early 
1970s. New Zealand branches of international organisations prospered. This is 
indicated by World Vision’s $10,500,000 income in 1990. In 1992 this organisation 
raised $17,000,000. Oxfam, just two years from its New Zealand inception, raised 
$611,402 in 1992 (Consumer, 1993). CORSO lost its Ministry of External Affairs 
grant as the Ministry became concerned to direct its resources through the most viable 
organisations23. In a 1991 CORSO Newsletter Christian Children’s Fund is rebuked 
                                                
23 It is worth noting that as recently as 1996 CORSO received a government grant of $146,000 for 
agricultural rehabilitation work in Sierra Leone and Ethiopia (New Zealand Executive Government 
News, 1996). This is evidence more of a residual role in overseas aid and development pertaining to 
their historically developed distributions network, and not necessarily an indication of essential 
organisational vitality, because the specified funds conferred no allocational discretion to CORSO. 
 20 
for coming to New Zealand (Overview, 1991). By 1992 that organisation raised funds 
of $2,000,000. 
CORSO had come to be viewed as a fringe group, promoting a radical agenda. The 
focus on attacking capitalism and addressing Maori poverty was a path that the New 
Zealand public were unwilling to follow (Evening Post, 1994). Moreover, their 
development agenda that evolved from the early 1970s was poorly understood. Those 
directly involved in aid had a greater understanding of this agenda and its merits but 
this was not reflected in the general population (Applied Research Consultants, 1987). 
In response to this situation, and negative media attention in the form of a Frontline 
television episode in which CORSO’s demise was foreshadowed, the organisation 
cancelled its 1990 annual ‘door-knock’ collection, preferring a postal appeal. In 
successive years supporting television advertising was eliminated and envelope 
distribution restricted to ‘high response’ areas. This approach was aimed at cost 
reduction, responding to the competitive threat of other organisations. This 
unquestionably accelerated CORSO’s decline and can be seen as reactive, rather than 
a strategic choice. 
3.0 CORSO beyond 1991: A post-script 
The organisation today exists as a marginalised shell of its former self. It seeks to 
advance its radical domestic agenda in relation to Maori development and Tiro 
Rangitiratanga or sovereignty (CORSO Aotearoa New Zealand, 2005). Beyond this it 
berates free-trade and bodies established to promote free trade, including the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and GATT. CORSO today opposes New Zealand’s role in 
prescribing free-market approaches to trade for Pacific Island nations, and is 
politically at the radical left, reflected in its focus on globalisation and its negative 
implications (GATT watchdog, 1998; 1997). In this view transnationals are seen as 
‘villains’. The IMF is viewed as seeking control of developing countries, imposing 
demands on them for economic reform as loan conditions. Traces of CORSO exist in 
two branches (Wellington and Dunedin). Contemporary CORSO is beyond the 
purview of this study; however ‘default brand persistence’ provides a plausible 
explanation for the continuation of the CORSO name. 
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4. 0  A relevant theoretical framing 
Change is the focus of much theory and research on institutions yet it is only recently 
that situations involving deinstitutionalisation and re-institutionalisation or 
legitimatisation of a range of organisational forms have been considered (Scott, 2001). 
In regards to the collapse of a national charity ‘brand’, we understand that CORSO’s 
weakening of, and disappearance from its formerly strong position comprises a 
deinstitutionalisation subsequent to its loss of legitimation. As Scott (2001) outlines, 
changed beliefs and behaviours are indicated in such a decline and therefore the 
causes of deinstitutionalisation are multiple. Whilst there could be an argument for 
entropy
24
 as a macro level explanation for all such demise, it is an aim of this paper to 
provide opportunity for institutional learning, at the micro level at least. Critical 
decisions taken by CORSO’s governing body regarding firstly development versus 
aid and secondly, the openness of membership, shaped and shunned the legitimacy it 
had generated from its position as a coalition of ‘heartland’ New Zealand not-for-
profit organisations. 
In relation to the study of not-for-profit institutions, the role of legitimacy has been 
canvassed by a number of researchers (e.g. Cribb, 2005; Irvine, 1999). Not-for-profit 
organisations particularly require social acceptability and credibility in order to attract 
the material and human resources needed to survive. This acceptability is generalised 
to the term legitimacy within a particular framework of resource dependency wherein 
the charity is attentive to its donors and funders and is particularly concerned when 
funding has excessive conditions attached (Ebrahim, 2003). The manner in which 
these organisations manage their dependency on external resources affects the 
likelihood of ultimate survival. 
4.2 The relationship to CORSO history: shaping and shunning 
In regards to the shaping of CORSO’s legitimacy, the move to prefer development 
over aid was a critical decision that brought a new cognitive framework for 
philanthropic overseas aid in New Zealand. CORSO’s early success was founded on a 
high level of legitimacy, obtained by satisfying the public’s interest in fulfilling an 
altruistic impulse towards war refugees. A keen sense of a privileged position in 
                                                
24 This is the tendency towards disorganisation in the social system and is preferred by a particular 
school of institutional theorists (Scott, 2001) 
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having been spared the destruction and privations of war’s impact on the civilian 
population, in part, informed by accounts of servicemen returning from World War II, 
dictated an original objective of relieving suffering and dislocation caused by war 
(Lineham & Davidson, 1987). The paucity of conflict on the previous scale in the 
years succeeding the war led to an extension of aid and relief overseas on a more 
general basis, yet the emphasis remained on a reactive approach to immediate 
humanitarian demands (CORSO Annual Report, 1955; 1965).  
When CORSO initiated its controversial expanded programme combining aid and 
development, the public’s prior support waned (e.g. Otago Daily Times, 2000; Survey 
one, n.d.). The preference for development lacked resonance with either donors or 
supporters and CORSO worked hard to educate its stakeholders as to the benefits of 
this approach (e.g. Arnold and Glensor, 1974) which the governing body deemed to 
be essential. Crisis aid was a ‘band-aid’, but well developed infrastructure in 
developing countries would reduce the need for such aid. This changed emphasis was 
therefore internally driven and CORSO took opportunities to legitimate the new focus. 
In so doing, they responded to donors’ or supporters’ resistance for efforts to change 
commonly held beliefs. That they were successful is evidenced by the manner in 
which new international aid-agencies, also espousing these views, expanded rapidly in 
New Zealand (see Figure 1). Therefore we do not believe that this critical decision 
was fatal to the organisation and effective communication would have shaped a 
positive future legitimacy for CORSO.  
Of a more instrumental nature in CORSO’s decline were critical decisions over 
membership which were tantamount to shunning the organisational legitimacy built 
by CORSO over thirty years. Strategically, the inclusive and loose nature of 
membership with multiple conflicting beliefs and aims allowed strong lobbyists to 
capture the organisation. This was an endogenous, ‘bottom-up’ change (Oliver, 1990) 
imposed on the organisation by powerful groups (DiMaggio, 1988) aided by the 
inherent weakness of the coalition governance of CORSO’s. 
Typically, successful coalitions rely on sufficient goal-based convergence to maintain 
coherence rather than a comprehensive set of shared goals. Therefore the domination 
of constituent identities requires strong, centralised internal control. Initially CORSO 
lacked effective control until it was won by a ‘new breed’ of organisational leader 
(not later than 1979). Prior organisational weakness was aggravated by a non-
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combative and inclusive approach to this new breed by the organisation’s traditional 
membership. These factors enabled the ‘capture’ of CORSO by radical constituent 
factions, resulting in a loss of shared identity and vision as has been evidenced in 
other philanthropic organisations (for example the Myer Foundation (Johns & D’Cruz, 
2004), Federal Alliance of Citizens’ Initiatives for Environmental Protection 
(Markham, 2005)). A rift between traditional groups (such as Rotary and the Lepers’ 
Trust Board) and newer groups, including the University Students’ Association, 
emerged (Dominion, 1974a; 1974b). Disaffection, both internally and throughout the 
wider community, was a consequence of CORSO’s changed political direction. This 
saw the decline in member groups from sixty in 1974 to thirty-nine in 1983
25
 and, in 
turn, evidenced reduced public support for CORSO from 1973. Strong leadership was 
required to be balanced against the importance of the broader constituency, whose 
active support was uniquely essential to CORSO’s fund inflows. 
It appears that the more radical elements responsible for CORSO’s capture were 
unable to identify the inextricable link between CORSO’s social capital and its 
continued need to serve the public interest in order to retain its legitimacy. Some part 
of this is evident in General Secretary Truell’s satisfied account of reducing the 
organisation’s reliance on ‘church people’ (Lovell-Smith, 1986) where, although he 
identified the decreased role of the traditional membership of CORSO, he omitted to 
assess the negative implications for CORSO in this development, which was similar 
to a hostile corporate takeover, or capture of a previously apolitical organisation. 
Public interest literature with regards to regulators employs capture theory to warn 
against strong lobbyists who may capture a body established to ensure constituent 
legitimacy
26
. This paper suggests capture theory can be extended to situations that are 
not regulatory but relate to coalitions in the not-for-profit sector. The greater total 
community interest lacked concentration and therefore CORSO was captured by 
radical groups, leading to its deinstitutionalisation.  
5.0 Conclusion 
CORSO began life as an organisation designed to coordinate activities geared towards 
overseas relief. Legitimacy theory provides an undemanding theoretical frame for 
                                                
25 See Appendix 1 for a listing of membership groups over these years 
26 In that regulators monitor compliance with legislation in the public interest and that public interest is 
perceived as legitimate. 
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early CORSO, explaining the period of crisis in relation to reduced legitimacy when, 
in the 1960s, CORSO began to focus increasingly on development to build 
foundations for impoverished peoples overseas to gain greater self-reliance. This 
change in strategic direction was insufficiently communicated to the general public, 
though it was generally accepted within the organisation. A CORSO member, CWS 
(NZ), also chose development over aid and yet managed to maintain its legitimacy. 
This suggests a comparative analysis of these related organisations offers future 
research potential.  
Key to CORSO’s demise was a change in strategic direction brokered by governing 
members which resulted in a philosophical shift unsupported by many of its core 
orthodox member bodies, with ‘fatal’ consequences. CORSO from 1990 was not a 
broad-based coalition, but survives as a persistent, yet impaired, brand name 
employed by a small coalition of socialists and Maori radicals. CORSO failed to erect 
barriers to capture, or to recognise it. This historic perspective on the demise of such a 
giant in New Zealand charities provides a clear illustration of a failure to sense and 
adapt sufficiently to its dynamic political landscape, and illustrates how the not-for-
profit sector is more dependant than other sectors on continuing legitimisation 
processes in its implicit contract with the society to which it offers its vision. 
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Appendix One. Association Membership of CORSO as at 31
st
 March in 
three different time periods 
 1971 1975 1981  
Association of Anglican Women  x x x 
Association of Presbyterian Women  x  x x 
Boys Brigade x  x x 
Catholic Nurses Guild of NZ x  x  
Catholic Women's league of NZ x  x x 
Chinese Association of NZ x  x x 
Christian Pacifist Society x  x  
Christian World Service x  x x 
Christian Family Movement   x x 
Divisional Union of Soroptomist Clubs x  x  
Dominion Federation of Townswomen's Guilds x  x  
Federation of Business and Professional Women's 
Clubs x  x  
Federated Farmers of NZ x  x  
Federation of Labour x  x x 
Girl Guides Association x  x  
Korean Orphan and Poor Family Scheme x  x x 
Leprosy Mission of NZ x  x x 
Lepers' Trust Board x  x  
Maori Women's Welfare League x  x  
Medical Aid Abroad x  x x 
Methodist Women's fellowship x  x x 
National Commission for UNESCO x  x   
National Council of Churches x  x  
National Council of Women of NZ x  x  
NZ Catholic Overseas Aid x  x x 
NZ Educational Institute x  x x 
NZ Family Planning Association (Inc.)   x x 
NZ Federation of Young Farmers x  x  
NZ federation of University Women x  x x 
NZ Friends' Service Committee x  x x 
NZ Home Service Committee   x  
NZ Indian Central Association x  x x 
NZ Inter-church Council on Public Affairs x  x   
NZ Jaycees (Inc.)   x  
NZ Nurses' Christian Fellowship x  x  
NZ Order of St. John   x  
NZ Registered Nurses Association x  x  
NZ Returned Services Association   x  
NZ Student Christian Movement x  x x 
NZ University Students Association x  x x 
Scouts Association of NZ   x  
St. Vincent de Paul Society x  x x 
Student Teachers Association   x  
Toc H NZ x  x  
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The Girls' Brigade x  x x 
The Save the Children Fund x  x  
UNICEF National Committee x  x x 
United Nations Association x  x x 
Wellington Jewish Relief and Welfare Society (Inc.) x  x x 
World University Service x  x x 
Young Christian Workers Movement x  x x 
YMCA x  x x 
YWCA x  x x 
Youth Hostels Association of New Zealand (Inc.)   x  
NZ Federation of Country Girl's Clubs (Inc.) x   
Rotary of NZ x   
Maori Council of NZ   x 
Trade Aid   x 
Citizens Association for Racial equality (CARE)   x 
NZ Public Service Association   x 
    
ASSOCIATE MEMBERS    
Campaign against Foreign Control in NZ   x 
NZ Values Party   x 
National Anti-Apartheid Council   x 
 
  
Sources: CORSO Annual Reports, 1972: 1976; 1982. 
 
Note: Two features are noteworthy in the changing composition of CORSO. There is 
a decline in membership by traditional, apolitical groups and an increase in those 
groups with a political agenda. Most obvious amongst this group are the associate 
members, The Maori Council of New Zealand, CARE and the University Students 
Association. The withdrawal of the Lepers’ Trust Board, Rotary, Jaycees, The Order 
of St. John and other such bastions of ‘middle’ New Zealand must have had a 
significant impact on CORSO’s fortunes. In relation to the termination of Save the 
Children Fund’s membership, this relates to its direct and competing role in the New 
Zealand aid market. 
 
